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In March 2003 the Norwegian government implemented yardstick based price regulation 
schemes on a selection of drugs experiencing generic competition. The retail price cap, 
termed “index price”, on a drug (chemical substance) was set equal to the average of the three 
lowest producer prices on that drug, plus a fixed wholesale and retail margin. This is supposed 
to lower barriers of entry for generic drugs and to trigger price competition. Using monthly 
data over the period 1998-2004 for the 6 drugs (chemical entities) included in the index price 
system, we estimate a structural model enabling us to examine the impact of the reform on 
both demand and market power. Our results suggest that the index price helped to increase the 
market shares of generic drugs and succeeded in triggering price competition. 
 
 
   
1. Introduction 
 
When a pharmaceutical patent expires, generic firms may enter the market and start 
selling copies of the original drug. As generic drugs contain exactly the same active 
chemical substances, these are certified to be perfect substitutes to the original branded 
drugs. In competitive markets entry of firms producing perfect substitutes would trigger 
fierce price competition, bringing monopoly rents enjoyed by the original patent holder to 
an end. Scale economies are not considered to be important in production of already 
innovated drugs. As reported by Caves et al. (1991), the fermentation technologies 
extensively used to produce the active chemical entities are batch processes carried out 
on small scale, and the production capacity for assembling active and inert ingredients 
into pills or capsules is largely flexible. Thus, looking at the supply side only, drug prices 
above marginal costs after patent expiration are expected to induce entry by generic 
producers. 
 
Although generic entry has become more extensive both in Europe and the US, it is well 
known that entry of generic drugs appears to be gradual in many countries (Berndt et al. 
2002). Brand name producers are often able to maintain a high-price strategy instead of 
engaging in fierce price competition with generics. Both theoretical and empirical 
research have shown that the brand name producer may choose to meet generic 
competition by raising prices, targeting the market segment that remains loyal to the 
branded drug. 
 
The persistence of demand for branded drugs when cheaper perfect substitutes become 
available means that physicians and patients develop choice habits that are not easily 
changed (see Hellerstein (1998) and Stern and Trajtenberg (1998)). Doctors may become 
loyal to some drug companies, which may steer their choice of drugs irrespective of the 
price. Habit formation is of particular importance in this market since physicians do not 
have economic incentives to let drug prices affect their choices, or to keep themselves 
informed about new generics entering the market. Physicians have incentives to serve the 
  2interests of their patients, but the insurance schemes in many countries make the patient 
ignorant about drug prices. In most countries, therefore, drug prices are subject to 
regulation. Regulating prices, when the drug producer has a patent, and only imperfect 
substitutes are available, involves bilateral bargaining that leaves some market power to 
the producer. Once patent protection expires, and generic producers may enter, regulation 
can be substantially improved by introducing benchmarking schemes. 
 
The aim of this paper is to study competition between generics and branded drugs in the 
Norwegian market, and in particular, how competition responded to a recent regulatory 
reform involving benchmarking. There is an extensive literature on the effect of generic 
entry on prices, but few examples of empirical studies of the performance of price 
regulation schemes as such. The reform in Norway represents a unique policy experiment 
allowing us to investigate the performance of yardstick based price regulation. 
 
For this purpose we develop an empirical model with two components. First, we estimate 
a demand model in which doctor-patient’s choices follows from a discrete choice 
structure with random utility function, which implies multinomial logit choice 
probabilities. Second, assuming that the drug producers set prices non-cooperatively to 
maximize profit and adhering to our estimated price elasticities, we derive a time-
conditioned measure of market power – the Lerner index – for each product. Our model 
belongs to the class of models studied by Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995). 
 
Our results suggest that the yardstick based price scheme had a significant impact on 
market power. Generic drugs experience a significant increase in demand after the 
reform, and the estimated first order regressive process of market power reveals that 
competition works. Furthermore, the estimated effect of yardstick-based regulation on 
demand indicates reduced market power. 
 
Several studies provide insights on the nature of competition in the market for 
pharmaceuticals after patent expiration. Grabowski and Vernon (1992) examine the effect 
of generic entry in the US market on prices for 18 drugs that were first exposed to generic 
  3competition during the years 1983 through 1987. Their descriptive statistics reveal that 
the branded drug price increased by an average of 7 percent one year subsequent to 
generic entry and 11 percent two years after generic entry. At the same time generic 
prices continue to fall after first entry. The average generic price two years after entry 
was 35 percent lower than the first entry price. 
 
Frank and Salkever (1997) arrived at similar results when they looked at a sample of 32 
drugs that lost patent protection during early to mid-1980s. More competition among 
generic drug producers is found to cause price reductions for those drugs. Increased 
competition from generic drugs, however, is not accompanied by lower prices on branded 
drugs. Their results suggest instead a small price increase on branded drugs. Caves et al. 
(1991) investigate the experience of 30 drugs that lost patent protection between 1976 
and 1987. Their result differs from that of Frank and Salkever (1997). The branded drug 
price declines with the number of generic entrants, but the rate of decline is small. For the 
mean number of generic drugs, the brand name price declines by 4.5 percent only. At the 
same time, generic prices are much lower than the brand name prices. Their results 
suggest that average generic price is about 50 percent of the branded drug price when 3 
generic producers have entered the market. 
 
Whereas these studies concern the effect of competition on prices, Hudson (2000) reports 
results on the determinants of generic entry itself. In his data 70 percent of the 50 
chemical entities that went of off patent in the years 1985-1996 were taken up by generic 
firms in the US market. The extent of generic entry varies between countries. In the UK 
market, for example, only 37 percent of the drugs were taken up by generic producers. 
Market size in terms of sales value increases the likelihood of generic entry. 
 
Our focus is on the effect of regulatory schemes, and not on the competition between 
branded and generic drugs. Pavcnik (2002) offers a recent study of regulatory schemes. 
With use of data from the German market, she investigates what effect the introduction of 
reference-pricing had on competition between branded and generic drugs. Drug prices are 
found to drop after the introduction, and generic competition is shown to play an 
  4important role in this process. The price on branded drugs fell on average by more than 
the price on generic drugs. The price drop on branded drugs increases with the number of 
generics in the market. Winkelmann (2004) studies another aspect of the statutory health 
insurance in Germany. The prescription fee paid by the patient increased substantially in 
1997. This price increase on prescription drug is found to reduce the number of doctor 
visits on average by 10 percent. 
 
The plan of the paper is at follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the Norwegian 
market for pharmaceuticals and its reforms. Section 3 presents the data used in the 
analysis. Our demand model is specified in Section 4, and the price setting part is 
presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents estimates and Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2. The pharmaceutical market in Norway 
 
As in most other countries the pharmaceutical market in Norway is subject to regulation. 
Regulation of prescription drugs concerns both producers’ entry and pricing decisions 
and the pharmacies’ retail margins, whereas the regulation of OTC drugs concerns entry 
decisions only. The regulatory authority related to the pharmaceutical sector is the 
Norwegian Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. The Ministry, and its agency 
(Norwegian Medicines Control Authority) control the entry of new type of drugs, the 
wholesale prices, and the retail margins. The manufacturer price is not regulated. 
 
The Norwegian Health System offers a statutory public health insurance, and close to 70 
percent of total drug expenses are covered by this insurance scheme. These expenses 
have been increasing rather rapidly due to an ageing population and entry of new and 
more expensive drugs. Looking at drugs that are approved for reimbursement by the 
social insurance schemes, the share of total cost paid by the patient amounts to 11 percent 
in Norway. This is much lower than in other Nordic countries. In Denmark this share 
  5amounts to 42 percent, while in Sweden the patients cover 26 percent. In UK, Spain, and 
France the patients pay only 6-7 percent of total costs.
2 
 
During the last decade several reforms have been implemented to encourage switching to 
generic drugs. Parallel imports were introduced in 1998, and pharmacists were allowed to 
keep 50 percent of the savings if they were able to obtain lower prices on these drugs. In 
1999 doctors were required to prescribe the generic with the lowest price. However, this 
recommendation and the reference price system used proved not sufficient to increase 
physicians’ awareness on prices. 
 
In Norway two recent reforms have been introduced to foster competition and to lower 
prices. Generic substitution was introduced in March 2001. Generic substitution ensures 
that the actual choice of drug producer is made less dependent on physicians’ prescription 
policy. For a sample of about 100 drugs (chemical substances), pharmacies were 
permitted to substitute a generic for a branded drug, independent of which producer that 
was prescribed by the physician. Being permitted to intervene between the physician and 
the patient, the pharmacies now have an important influence on whether the branded drug 
or a generic drug is chosen. Generic substitution, therefore, is expected to lower barriers 
to entry for generic drugs by reducing the importance of prescription habits for actual 
drug choices in pharmacies. The problem with this scheme turned out to be that vertically 
integrated wholesalers
3 and retailers could still sell these (cheaper drugs) at prices equal 
to the fixed price cap. No link was introduced between the wholesalers’ input prices 
(producer prices) and the retailers’ price caps (see Razzolini, 2004). 
 
With the reform of March 2003 such a link was established. The retail price cap, termed 
“index price”, on a drug (chemical substance) was updated every third months and set 
equal to the average of the three lowest reported producer prices on that drug, plus a fixed 
                                                 
2 LMI (2005). All figures are 2002-observations. 
3 Generic substitution was introduced together with a substantial liberalization of the pharmacy market. 
With the new pharmacy act of 2001 restrictions on ownership were abolished, and most of the pharmacies 
were sold to the three main wholesalers. The Norwegian market is now characterized by having three 
vertically integrated distribution companies, without legal regulation on entry of new companies or 
pharmacy outlets. 
  6distribution (wholesale and retail) margin. If a retailer selects a producer with a price 
exceeding the average of the three lowest prices, the net margin of the integrated retailer-
wholesale pharmacy firm drops, whereas a retailer selecting a producer with a lower 
producer price experiences an increase in his net margin. The reform is both expected to 





The dataset is provided by the Norwegian Social Insurance Agency, and covers monthly 
observation of the six chemical substances included in the index price system. The data 
are collected at 22 pharmacies in Norway in the period 1998-2004. The sample of 
pharmacies is considered to be representative for the sale of drugs in Norway. The main 
variables reported by the pharmacies are volume of sale, both in retail value (NOK)
4 and 
number of defined daily doses (DDD) for each product. These are used to calculate the 
prices per DDD and market shares of each product within the submarket (chemical 
substance). 
 
Note that the number of products exceed the number of producers of a chemical 
substance because a drug is sold in different versions according to strength, 
representation form (pills or fluid) and package size. For each of the six chemical 
substances, we have selected the version with the highest sales value. The chemical 
substances subjected to index price regulation, and covered by our data, are given in 
Table 1. 
                                                 
4 As of Nov 2005 1USD is around NOK 6.80 
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Table 1: Sample of drugs 
ATC-code  Generic name  Indication  Brand name 
producer 
First entry of 
generica 
A02BC01  Omeprazol  Ulcer   AstraZeneca  November 2001 
C09AA02 Enalapril  High  blood 
pressure 
MSD Norge  October 
2000 





N06AB04 Citalopram  Depression  H.Lundbeck  May   
2002 
R06AE07 Cetirizin  Allergy  UCB  Pharma  February 
2002 
R06AX13 Loratadin  Allergy  ScheringPlough  April 
2002 
 
The products are classified as the branded drug (original patented product), parallel 
imported branded drug, or generic drug. 
 
In Appendix A we report the development of prices and market shares for the products in 
these six markets. The time period is 1998-2004. We observe that prices and market 
shares of the branded drugs started to decline a little before the generics entered the 
market. The decline in the market shares of the branded drugs prior to entry of generics is 
due an increase in the market share of the parallel imports, from lower price countries 
such as Spain and Greece. When generics enters the market there are a further decline in 
the market share of the branded drugs and a further drop in the prices of branded drugs. 
 
 
4. A demand model 
 
The institutional settings in the pharmaceutical market define a complex mechanism for 
drug choices. Demand for drugs is often assumed to follow from the doctor’s choices as 
the patient’s agent. Looking at submarkets with generic substitution, pharmacies may 
intervene in the actual choice of drug. Total demand for a drug, with a given chemical 
substance, is still determined by the doctors, but pharmacies become important for the 
  8actual choice of producer within the market defined by the chemical substance. As 
explained above, pharmacies are required by law to substitute the prescribed product with 
a cheaper product/producer (if available). Importantly, both the patient and the doctor are 
allowed to prevent substitution. The doctor can add a reservation to the prescription, 
which prohibits pharmacies to substitute. Even without such a reservation, the patient 
may insist on the prescribed product. In that case, the insurance scheme does not cover 
the price difference between the prescribed product and the cheapest available. The 
difference has to be paid by the patient himself. 
 
We assume that the doctor/patient-alliance’s choice maximizes the utility of the patient. 
All patients are assumed to have the same deterministic part of the indirect utility. Let Im 
be the number of drugs (producers) available in market m. A market is defined by the 
chemical substance (lowest level of the ATC-code). The indirect utility from drug 
i=1,2,,,Im in market m, m=1,2,..,6 in month t, by patient/doctor n is random, and given by  
 
imnt imt imt imt imnt e P a g U + + = , 
 
where Pimt is the price of drug i in market m at time t. gimt is a drug specific effect, and 
eimnt is a random variable iid extreme value distributed across drugs, markets, 
patients/doctors and time. Heterogeneity in patient/doctor preferences is represented by 
the iid error term. aimt is a coefficient related to price. 
 










Pr(U max U |i,j 1,2,,,I ,m 1,2,,,6)
exp(g a P )
;i 1,2,,I ,m 1,2,,,6







   





1mt 1mt 1mt imt imt imt
1mt
imt
1mt 1mt 1mt imt imt imt
1mt
;i 2,,,I
exp((g g ) (a P a P ))
and










Because all individuals have the same deterministic part of the utility function, the 
observed parallel to the log of the relative probabilities equals the log of the market share 
of drug i relative to the market share of drug 1. 
 
We assume that  
 
(3) gimt =gim +vimt; i=1,2,,,Imt 
 
gim is a constant that varies across drug types and reflects some attributes of the drugs 
beyond price. Although these drugs are very close substitutes, since they all contain the 
same active ingredients, there are still reasons to believe that drug specific effects are 
present. One reason is that the drugs differ with respect to inert ingredients, shape, 
packaging and labeling. In addition, the producers run advertising campaigns that might 
affect the doctors’ choice of a certain drug (see Scott Morton, 2000, and Coscelli, 2000). 
 
The parameter vimt is a random variable assumed to have zero expectation, with constant 
and equal variance across drugs, markets and time, assumed uncorrelated across drugs, 
markets and time. 
 
A general characteristic of the drug market is that branded drugs are able to maintain 
large market shares and high prices after the entry of cheaper generic drugs. Although 
generic drugs enter with substantial lower prices, demand responds are often weak. To 
  10capture this, we allow branded and generic drugs to have different price responses. 
Moreover, the price response on demand for generic drugs are allowed to depend on the 








aa a G D
A
=+  
Here   is a constant that we expect to be negative since it captures the direct effect of 




GDimt is a dummy variable. GDimt =1 if drug i in market m is a generic drug. Since 
parallel imported branded drugs are not treated as generic drugs, not all drugs i≠1 are 
generic drugs. Aimt equals the number of months drug i≠1 has been on the market. Thus 
the ratio of Aimt to A1mt measures the “market age” of drug i relative to the “market age” 
of the branded product. If the drug has been in the market since 1998, the ratio is equal to 
one. For younger drugs, the ratio takes values less than one. Total price response for the 
branded drug is captured by the direct effect  , whereas for the generic drugs “the 
market age” of the drug is allowed to matter. If, for given prices, generic drugs 




The new regulation scheme, the index price system, was introduced March 2003. In order 
to identify the effect on demand for generic drugs, we represent this new policy in our log 
odds ratio equation above by the variable τt, which takes the value 1 for t=March 2003 
and the following months, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Thus the log odds ratio that we estimate is the following 
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(5)  01 1 1 2
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imt imt
mi imt mt imt imt mt imt t imt
mt mt
A










for i=1,2,,,Imt, m=1,2,,,6 and t=Jan1998,,,Dec2004. 
 
If the policy intervention succeeded, a  will be positive. For given prices, generic drugs 
will experience a positive shift in demand. 
2
 
From (5) we can derive demand elasticities. Let Eijmt denote these elasticities and they are 
defined as the elasticity of demand of drug i with respect to price of drug j. If i=j, we 
have the direct elasticities, otherwise we have the cross-price elasticities. Formally the 
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where aimt is given in (4). 
 








1 0 + = for a generic drug. If  , the numerical value of the price 
coefficient a
1 0 a ≥
imt decreases over time, and consequently the price elasticity of generic drugs 
decreases over time. This time effect is reinforced by the expected increase in market 
shares following the introduction of the index price reform. Increased market shares will, 
for given prices, reduce the price elasticity. Note that for the branded drugs  . If 
the reform works to increase market shares of generic drugs, there will be a 
corresponding increase in the own-price elasticity of branded drugs. 
0 a aimt =
  125. Market power 
 
We assume that the producers set prices in order to maximize expected profit, given the 
prices set by the other producers. Thus, the prices are set in a non-cooperative game of 
the Bertrand-Nash type. 
 
Expected profit, denoted πimt is given by 
 
(7)  , 
mt imt imt imt imt imt (P c )N K π= − ϕ−
 
where cimt is a constant unit cost of producing and distributing drug i in market m at time 
t, Nmt are the number of patients in market m at time t, and Kimt is fixed costs. 
 





1 Pc E =+ −
 
 
An indicator of market power is the so-called Lerner index, defined as  
 














imt imt imt imt iimt





=   
 
 
By convention we set Limt=1 when there is a monopoly. We note that under perfect 
competition Limt=0.  
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If competition works, high price-cost margins in the market would attract entry of 
generics. When the maximal market power is high, as measured by the Lerner index, 
more firms will enter and profit margins will gradually be reduced. If this is the case, the 
market power that firm i in market m can obtain at time t follows a first order regressive 
process. To investigate whether this mechanism is at work in the Norwegian 
pharmaceutical market, we estimate the following market power equation: 
 
(11)   
imt im i mi(t 1) imt Lb b m a x L u − =+ +
 
Competition works if b<1, and the expected long run maximal market power, denoted   
















Estimation is performed in two steps. First, we estimate the demand model in order to 
identify the price effects on the demand – both branded and generics – and the effect of 
the index price model. Second, using information on price elasticities acquired from step 
one, we calculate the producer specific Lerner index and estimate the Lerner index 
process equation. 
 
Endogeneity bias problems may arise when the unknown coefficients in the demand 
equations (5) are estimated by OLS. The reason is that the prices occurring on the right 
hand side in (4) depends on the market share through the price setting equations (8). 
There are thus good reasons to believe that unobserved elements in price setting are 
correlated with the error terms in the market share equations.  
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To obtain unbiased estimates we can either try to specify the joint probability for random 
market shares and random prices (and estimate the unknown coefficients in a full 
information maximum likelihood procedure) or to use instrument variables. We will 
apply the latter procedure and instrument prices. 
 
We have instrumented the prices in a two stage least square procedure. First, prices are 
estimated on instruments, and then the predicted values of prices are used in the demand 
equations. The instrument variables used in the first stage price regression should be 
variables that affect the supply side and are uncorrelated with the error terms in the 
demand equations. Good instruments are thus correlated with costs (cost-shifters), but not 
with unobserved quality of the drugs we are considering. 
 
We have used two instruments. The first instrument is the price of similar drugs, with the 
same chemical substance, but with much higher strength. Drugs of different strengths are 
used against different illnesses or different degrees of illnesses. This instrument is 
correlated with costs because the molecules and the other inactive substances in the drugs 
are the same. This is a strong instrument, but the markets of drugs with different strength 
differ with respect to number of drugs on the market, and moreover the entry of generics 
occurs at different dates. The level of competition is thus different in the different 
markets. See Hausman et al (1994) and Nevo (2000) for studies that have used prices on 
similar goods as instruments. 
 
Following Brenkers and Verboven (2002) the quantity sold by the same producers in the 
Norwegian market, but with different atc codes, is used as the second instrument. We will 
argue that this variable contains useful information in a regulated and monopolistic 
market such as the pharmaceutical market. Sales of other drugs in the same markets 
signal that the producer has passed bureaucratic barriers related to regulations in the 
Norwegian market (familiarity) and also that the firm find it worth competing in this 
market (profitability).  
 
  15Demand 
 
Estimation results are set out in the table below. 
 
Table 2: Estimates of the demand equation 
Coefficients Estimates  without 
instrument variables 
t-values Estimates  with 
instrument variables 
t-values 







































The direct effect of prices on demand is negative and significant. When the prices are 
instrumented, the direct price responses become numerical much higher. The impact of 
“market age” on demand is significantly positive when no instruments are used, but 
disappears when instruments are used. This implies that the marginal price response on 
markets shares are the same for branded and generic drugs, and represented by  . The 
development of price elasticities over time, therefore, will be driven by changes in 
markets shares due to the index price and entry of producers. The impact of the yardstick 
based price regulation on demand for generic drugs is significant and positive in both 
models. Using instruments, the effect becomes stronger. 
0 a
 
In the next table we show the direct price elasticities, derived from the above estimates 
and evaluated at sample average values, for the six different markets and hence six 
different chemical substances. 
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Table 3: Estimated price elasticity 
Chemical substance (m)  Estimated elasticity, sample averages of Eiimt 
A02BC01 : Omeprazol  -7.8 
C09AA02 : Enalapril  -1.6 
C09AA03 : Lisinopril  -2.4 
N06AB04 : Citalopram  -3.4 
R06AE07 : Cetirizin  -1.3 





Using the estimated demand functions, we calculate the value of the Lerner index for 
each producer. In the next table we give the results from the estimation of the Lerner 
index AR(1) model 
 
Table 4: Estimates of the market power equation. 
Coefficients Estimate  t-value 
B 0.3720  8.42 
m b  (fixed effects)  0.1812 10.81 
 








These estimates imply that in the long run the Lerner index approaches 
 
0.1812 0.2866





  17which means that average market power approaches a level around 28 percent above the 
perfect competitive case. This log run outcome is far below, around 72 percent, the initial 
monopoly case. 
 
To illustrate the effect of the policy intervention on market power, we have calculated the 
average Lerner index with (Lerner 1) and without the policy intervention effect (Lerner 
2).
5 Of course, this only demonstrates how important the different parameters are, given 
the observed data. Without the policy reform something else might have happened in the 
market, but clearly our results indicate that the index price policy had a significant impact 
on competition is this market. 
 










1998m1 2000m1 2002m1 2004m1
mnd
lerner1 lerner2












                                                 
5 Lerner 1 includes a2 in demand function for generic drugs.  
6. Conclusions 
 
In March 2003 the Norwegian government implemented yardstick based price regulation 
schemes on a selection of drugs experiencing generic competition. The retail price cap, 
termed “index price”, on a drug (chemical substance) was set equal to the average of the 
three lowest producer prices on that drug, plus a fixed wholesale and retail margin. This 
is supposed to lower barriers of entry for generic drugs and to reduce market power. 
Using monthly data over the period 1998-2004 for the 6 drugs (chemical entities) 
subjected to the index price regulation, we estimate a structural model enabling us to 
examine the impact of the reform on both demand and market power. Our results suggest 
that the index price helped to increase the market shares of generic drugs and succeeded 
in reducing overall market power. 
 





Berndt, E. R., Pindyck, R. S. og Azolay P. (2003). ”Consumption Externalities 
and Diffusion in Pharmaceutical Markets: Antiulcer Drugs”. Journal of 
Industrial Economics, Vol. 51, pp. 243-270, June. 
 
Berry S. T. (1994), “ Estimating Discrete choice model of product 
differentiation”.  The RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 25, Issue 2 
(summer), 242-262. 
 
Berry S.T. (1995), Levinsohn J. Pakes A., “Automobile Prices in Market 
Equilibrium”, Econometrica ,Volume 63,  841-90. 
 
Brenkers R., Verboven  F.(2002), “Liberalizing a Distribution System  the European Car 
Market. CEPR Discussion Papers nr 3622. 
 
Caves R.E., Whinston M. D., and M. A. Hurwitz (1991), “Patent expiry, entry and 
competition in the US pharmaceutical industry”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 
Microeconomics, 1- 48. 
 
Coscelli A. (2000), “The importance of Doctors’ and Patients’ Preferences in the 
Prescription Decision”, The Journal of Industrial Economics Vol. 3, pp. 349-
369. 
 
Frank R.G., Salkever D.S. (1997), “Generic Entry and the Pricing of 
Pharmaceuticals”, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. Spring. pp. 
75-90. 
 
Grabowski H., Vernon J. (1992), “Brand Loyalty; Entry, and Price Competition 
in Pharmaceuticals after the 1984 Drug Act”, Journal of Law and Economics 35. 
 
Hausman J., Leonard G., Zona D. (1994),“Competitive Analysis with Differentiated 
Products” Annales d’Economie et de Statistique Vol.34 p. 159-180.  
 
Hellerstein J. (1998) “The importance of physician in the generic versus-trade 
name prescription decision”, The RAND Journal of Economics Volume 29, 109-
136. 
 
Hudson, J (2000): “Generic take-up in the pharmaceutical market following 
patent expiry. A multi-country study”. International Review of Law and 
Economics. Volume 20. pp. 205-221. 
 
  20LMI (2005): Facts and Figures. Norwegian Association of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers. 
 
Nevo A. (2000), “Mergers with Differentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-
to-Eat Cereal Industry”, RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 31, 395-421  
 
Pavcnik, N. (2002): “Do pharmaceutical prices respond to patient out-of-pocket 
expenses?” Rand Journal of Economics 33, Autumn 2002, pp. 469-487. 
 
Razzolini, T. (2004): The Norwegian market for pharmaceuticals and the non-
mandatory substitution reform of 2001: the case of enalapril. Memorandum 
12/04. Department of Economics. University of Oslo. 
 
Scott Morton F. (2000), “Barriers to Entry, Brand Advertising, and Generic Entry in the 
U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 18, 
N°7, p. 1085-1104.  
 
Stern S., Trajtenberg M. (1998),” Empirical Implications of Physician Authority in 
Pharmaceutical Decisionmaking” NBER Working Paper #6851 
 
Winkelmann, R. (2004): Co-payments for prescription drugs and the demand for doctor 
visits - Evidence from a natural experiment. Health Economics 13 (11). pp. 1081-1089. 
  21Appendix A. 
 
Table A. Observed prices NOK per DDD and market shares in the 6 markets 
considered, annual means of monthly data, Norway 1998-2004. 
 
Table A.1. ATC code A02BC01. Branded drug producer: Astra Zeneca. Strength 20. 
 







1998 19.76  0.77  17.33  0.23  -  0 
1999  19.36 0.997 18.11 0.003 -  0 
2000  17.86 0.80  17.55 0.19  15.12 0.01 
2001 16.58  0.70  16.44  0.3  -  0 
2002  16.17 0.71  16.47 0.06  14.44 0.23 
2003  12.53 0.58  15.65 0.11  12.09 0.31 
2004    9.27  0.61  -  0    9.29  0.39 
 
 
Table A.2. ATC code C09AA02. Branded drug producer: MSD. Strength 20. 
 




 share  
Price Market 
share 
1998  3.85 0.86 3.81 0.14 -  0 
1999 3.83  0.62  3.8  0.38  -  0 
2000  3.33 0.49 3.46 0.51 -  0 
2001  2.68 0.70 2.89 0.25 2.60 0.05 
2002  2.52 0.51 2.7  0.24 2.57 0.25 
2003  1.92 0.44 1.98 0.04 1.94 0.52 






  22Table A.3. ATC code C09AA03. Branded drug producer: Astra Zeneca. Strength 10. 
 




 share  
Price Market 
share 
1998 5.70  1  -  0  -  0 
1999 5.60  1  -  0  -  0 
2000 5.24  1  -  0  -  0 
2001 4.84  0.91  -  0  4.67  0.09 
2002 4.71  0.72  -  0  4.49  0.28 
2003 4.05  0.50  -  0  4.00  0.50 
2004 2.94  0.58  -  0  2.92  0.42 
 
 
Table A.4. Atc code N06AB04. Branded drug producer: H. Lundbeck. Strength 20. 
 




 share  
Price Market 
share 
1998 9.99  1    0  -  0 
1999 9.74  1    0  -  0 
2000 9.38  1    0  -  0 
2001 9.12  1    0  -  0 
2002  9.05 0.89 9.03 0.01 7.99 0.1 
2003 8.02  0.56  8.18  0.002  7.89  0.438 










  23Table A.5. Atc code R06AE07. Branded drug producer: UCB Pharma. Strength 10. 
 




 share  
Price Market 
share 
1998 3.51 1.0  -  0  -  0 
1999 3.50 1.0  -  0  -  0 
2000 3.51 1.0  -  0  -  0 
2001  3.61 0.99 3.61 0.01 -  0 
2002 3.61 0.63  3.60  0.1  3.14 0.27 
2003  2.98 0.36 3.21 0.04 2.85 0.60 
2004 2.31 0.34  -  0  2.42 0.66 
 
 
Table A.6. Atc code R06AX13. Branded drug producer: Schering –Pl. Strength 10. 
 




 share  
Price Market 
share 
1998 3.73 0.94  -  0  3.66 0.06 
1999  3.72 0.94 3.60 0.01 3.72 0.05 
2000  3.69 0.91 3.62 0.03 3.57 0.06 
2001  3.70 0.94 3.88 0.01 3.62 0.05 
2002  3.71 0.82 3.59 0.04 3.48 0.14 
2003 3.32 0.597 3.56  0.003 3.30 0.04 
2004 2.89 0.48  -  0  2.89 0.52 
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